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Limitations on the right to freedom of testation
M U N E E R  A B D U R O A F  
An order was sought for the deletion of the discriminatory provisions from
the trust deed based on s13 of the TPCA that allows the court to vary pro-
visions in a trust instrument. The court held that the constitutional obliga-
tion to remove provisions that are in conflict with public policy takes
precedence over freedom of testation. The court did not answer the ques-
tion as to whether the Constitution can be applied directly to the law of
succession (King NO and Others v De Jager and Others 2017 (4) All SA 57
(WCC)). It must be noted that the court placed considerable emphasis on
the fact that the trust was a public charitable one which operated in the
public sphere. It held that there can be no question that racially discrimi-
natory testamentary dispositions in the public sphere will not pass consti-
tutional muster. The court stated that testamentary dispositions in the pri-
vate sphere would require a totally different approach. 
The fourth case to look at is In re: Heydenrych Testamentary Trust and
Others 2012 (4) SA 103 (WCC). Judgment was handed down by the
Western Cape High Court. It dealt with discriminatory testamentary pro-
visions in a number of public charitable trusts. It was argued that the trusts
Part 2
In the previous article, I discussed two case studiesinvolving discriminatory testamentary provisions. Wenow move on to the third example; the matter of
Curators, Emma Smith Educational Fund v University of
KwaZulu-Natal 2010 (6) SA 518 (SCA) (Emma Smith
Educational Fund). The judgment was handed down by
the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA). It dealt with discrim-
inatory testamentary provisions in a public charitable
trust. Eligibility for the bursary was limited to European
girls who were born of British South African or Dutch
South African parents. It was further required that they
must have been resident in Durban for a period of at
least three years immediately preceding the grant. 
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“Judge”
T H E  C O N S T I T U T I O N A L  C O U R T  T R U S T
Sieberhagen aimed to leave the original weathered wood as untouched as
possible. According to him, he developed the theme for this specific piece
of wood from its expressive texture, “I wanted to contribute to the ‘story’
of the sculpture instead of completely imposing my will on the wood.
While carving the face, I felt that although the wood was weathered, the
face should have an inner strength and portray wisdom – the wisdom that
only comes with time and experience. From there, the idea developed
that I could carve the lines of the scales of justice into the sculpture”. 
The artwork embodies the core theme of the Constitutional Court Art
Collection: the intersection of art and justice.  
Artist Jaco Sieberhagen found a piece of drift-wood in a river running through the mountainsaround Worcester, which he sculpted into
“Judge” in 1999. 
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discriminated on the grounds of race, descent, and gender. An order was
sought for the deletion of the discriminatory provisions from the trust
deeds, on the basis of s13 of the TPCA. The court held that the provisions
constituted unfair discrimination on the grounds of race and gender and
were in conflict with the Constitution and the public interest. What
makes this case different from the
three previous cases is that it dealt
with multiple charitable trusts. The
issue in Heydenrych Testamentary
Trust was quite similar to that of
Syfrets Trust Ltd. The relief sought
in Heydenrych Testamentary Trust
was simply to widen the pool of
prospective applicants for the bur-
saries. It was not to take away bene-
fits from particular beneficiaries. It
applied in the public sphere and for
an indefinite period of time. 
The fifth case is Harper and Others v
Crawford NO and Others 2017 (4)
All SA 30 (WCC) (Harper). The
judgment was handed down by the
Western Cape High Court and dealt with discriminatory testamentary provi-
sions in a private trust deed. It was argued that the trust discriminated on the
basis of birth. An order was sought for the amendment of the trust deed to
include the excluded adopted children in terms of s13 of the TPCA. The
court noted that the relief sought was quite far reaching as it would infringe
the right to freedom of testation and that relief granted in previous cases of
this nature (the preceding four cases discussed) did nothing more than widen
the pool of prospective applicants for bursaries. The relief granted did not
take away benefits that were already conferred on specific beneficiaries nor
did it confer benefits on other persons. It further noted that the relief granted
in previous cases concerned public wills that concerned bursaries made avail-
able to applicants from the public. Public institutions were involved in
administering the bursaries. The court stated that the public element of dis-
crimination in such cases would lead to the right to equality taking preference
over the right to freedom of testation. The court held that it did not have the
competency to amend the trust deed, in the same way that it does not have
the authority to amend the will of a testator or testatrix.
The sixth case to discuss is King NO and Others v De Jager and Others
2017 (4) All SA 57 (WCC) (De Jager). The judgment was handed down
by the Western Cape High Court. It dealt with discriminatory testamen-
tary provisions in a private will. It was argued that the will discriminated
against certain persons on the ground of gender. An order was sought to
amend the will in order to include the excluded persons based on the com-
mon law which prohibits bequests that are contrary to public policy, and
on direct application of the equality provisions found in the Constitution.
The court noted that there were a number of problems with granting the
relief sought. It would mean that the court would be the final arbiter in
the choice of beneficiaries in testamentary dispositions of a non-public
nature, and would lead to situations where the last wishes of a testator or
testatrix are second-guessed by a court, by including excluded persons.
This is quite different to ‘amending the terms’ of a charitable trust as dis-
cussed in the first five cases. Those cases involved ‘determining altered
terms for how property that has been bequeathed should be administered’
by the trustees. This is quite different from determining whether property
should be bequeathed to a particular person. The application in De Jager
was dismissed and the will was not amended by the court. 
The discussion in Parts 1 and 2 has clearly shown that the right to
freedom of testation has been limited in South Africa, in terms of
both the common law and constitutional provisions. The investiga-
tion shows that discriminatory provisions that apply in the public
sphere are more open to scrutiny than those in the private sphere. It
recommended that these cases be kept in mind when drafting last
wills and testaments.  
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A change of direction for the Road Accident Fund?
B E R N A  M A L A N
The urgent application by the applicants, 42 firms of attorneys, was prompted
by changes that the Road Accident Fund (the RAF) is planning to imple-
ment to its existing litigation model. 
The applicants had previous service level agreements with the RAF which
were to terminate on 31 May. As the termination date of the service level
agreements approached, the RAF called on the various applicants to return
the litigation files in their possession (in certain time-based tranches). The
RAF also cancelled a pending tender that would have led to the award of
Mabunda Incorporated and Others v Road Accident
Fund and Others
On 27 March 2020, the North Gauteng HighCourt handed down judgment in the case ofMabunda Incorporated v Road Accident Fund
(15876/2020) (the RAF Judgment). 
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